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RECENT DECISIONS

is based upon the consideration
of whether or not the work let out
4
was inherently dangerous.
It is the court's admission that the letting of a contract for work
intrinsically dangerous by the tenement house owner does not delegate responsibility for injuries which he might have reasonably
guarded against. If, however, the injury results from a detail of
performance in the work and the work could have been done with
the exercise of due care on the contractor's part, then the contractor
alone would be liable for the failure to be reasonably careful. 5
The act of the contractor in leaving a dynamite cap in the
debris has been classified as a collateral act and as such the defendant
could not be held answerable for it. A distinction has been made
between those injuries which arise out of an act collateral with the
work which could not be guarded against beforehand and those injuries which arise out of work which is inherently dangerous and
where they might reasonably be expected.0 Collateral acts are defined as those involving details of work not ordinarily considered or
contemplated by the employer. This is founded on the belief that
an employer is not to be held liable for the unusual and abnormal mis7
conduct of the contractor's workmen in performance of the work.

G. P. O.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs-CONsIDERATION-PARTLY FOR SER-

VICES AND PARTLY AS A GIFT-DEFENSE PRO

TANT.-Respondent

filed suit to collect on a promissory note for $5,000 against decedent's
estate. The Probate Court of Minnesota disallowed the claim but
such judgment was reversed by the District Court of Minnesota and
an appeal is taken from that judgment. Respondent introduced evidence to the effect that decedent and respondent were engaged to be
married, and that she worked for respondent in his office. On June
27, 1940, respondent prepared the note in question at decedent's
office, and brought it to decedent at a house where he was confined,
at which time he signed it. She further testified that the note was
not "exactly" a gift, but that "it probably was a gift and compensation for my services." Held, affirmed. Personal services rendered
under such circumstances that there is a legal, obligation to pay for
them are sufficient consideration for a promissory note given for
them, regardless of their economic value as compared to the amount
of the note. A promise to pay made as a gift is without consideration
and is not binding, and if a note was given partly for services and
4 Storrs v. The City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 (1858) ; Deming v. Terminal
Ry. of Buffalo, 169 N. Y. 1, 61 N. E. 983 (1901).
I Engel v. Eureka Club, 137 N. Y. 100, 32 N. E. 1052 (1893).
e Boylhart v. Di Marco & Reimann Inc., 270 N. Y. 217, 200 N. E. 793
(1936).
7 PRossER ON ToRTs (1941) 490.
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partly as a gift the partial absence or failure of consideration is a
defense pro tanto; but the defense is allowed only to the extent that
it is shown, and the burden of proof is on the maker of the note.
Matter of the Estate of Hore,

-

Minn.

-,

19 N. W. (2d)

783

(1945).
No claim was made that the services were rendered gratuitously
because of the relationship of the parties; the evidence shows decedent
was indebted to respondent for services rendered at his request. The
giving of a promissory note for personal services is evidence that the
services were rendered upon the understanding that they should be
paid for even where the parties stand in a relationship from which
it might be presumed that the services were gratuitous, and in such
a case the services are sufficient consideration for the note.' While
the services may be sufficient consideration, they need not be adequate,
as the parties themselves place their own value on the services rendered. However, such is not the case here. Appellant claims and
respondent acknowledges the fact that part of the consideration was
a gift. Such an instance gives rise to the rule that partial
absence
2
or failure of consideration shall be a defense pro tanto.
The defense of partial want of consideration is allowed to the
extent that it is shown. The burden of proof is on the maker of the
note or his representative to show the partial want of consideration
and where the maker fails in his efforts to prove such fact, the holder
may recover the full amount of the note.3 If, however, the maker
sustains such proof, the holder may only recover up to the amount
for which a consideration was shown. Where there are "two distinct and independent considerations, each going to a distinct portion
of the note, and one is a consideration which the law deems valid
and sufficient to support a contract, and the other not, there the contract shall be apportioned, and the holder shall recover to the extent
of the valid consideration." 4 Appellant, however, by treating the
consideration as a single one and entire, and going to the note as a
whole, rejected the defense pro tanto which would have permitted
him to show the extent to which the note was a gift. Accordingly,
there was no ground for an apportionment and sufficient consideration
having been demonstrated, respondent is entitled to recover the face
amount of the note.
L. S. G.

1 Petty v. Young, 43 N. J. Eq. 654, 12 At. 392

(1887).

I. L. § 28: "Absence or failure of consideration is matter of defense
as against any person not a holder in due course; and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanrto whether the failure is an ascertained and
liquidated amount or otherwise."
3 Bisbee v. Torinus, 26 Minn. 165, 2 N. W. 168 (1879).
4 Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 198, 211, 25 Am. Dec. 378, 388 (1833).
2N.

